A public
protest in
Washington, DC, on April 5, 2005 highlighted the current
(ongoing, for centuries) plight of black Mauritanians
enslaved by Arab masters. The final two decades of the
20th century, moreover, witnessed a
jihad genocide, including
mass enslavement, perpetrated by the Arab Muslim
Khartoum government against black Christians and
animists in the Southern Sudan,
and
the same government’s
continued massacres and enslavement of Animist-Muslim
blacks in Darfur.
These tragic contemporary phenomena reflect the brutal
living legacy of jihad slavery.
Jihad Slavery
The fixed linkage between
jihad- a permanent, uniquely Islamic institution-
and enslavement, provides a very tenable explanation for
the unparalleled scale and persistence of slavery in
Muslim dominions, and societies. This general
observation applies as well to “specialized” forms of
slavery, including the (procurement and) employment of
eunuchs, slave soldiering (especially of adolescents),
other forms of child slavery, and harem slavery.
Jihad slavery, in its myriad manifestations, became
a powerful instrument for both expansive Islamization,
and the maintenance of Muslim societies.
Juridical Rationale and
Role in “Islamization”
Patricia Crone, in her
recent analysis of the origins and development of
Islamic political thought, makes an important nexus
between the mass captivity and enslavement of
non-Muslims during jihad campaigns, and the
prominent role of coercion in these major modalities of
Islamization. Following a successful jihad, she
notes:
Male captives might be
killed or enslaved, whatever their religious
affiliation. (People of the Book were not protected by
Islamic law until they had accepted dhimma.)
Captives might also be given the choice between Islam
and death, or they might pronounce the confession of
faith of their own accord to avoid execution: jurists
ruled that their change of status was to be accepted
even though they had only converted out of fear. Women
and children captured in the course of the campaigns
were usually enslaved, again regardless of their
faith…Nor should the importance of captives be
underestimated. Muslim warriors routinely took large
numbers of them. Leaving aside those who converted to
avoid execution, some were ransomed and the rest
enslaved, usually for domestic use. Dispersed in Muslim
households, slaves almost always converted, encouraged
or pressurized by their masters, driven by a need to
bond with others, or slowly, becoming accustomed to
seeing things through Muslim eyes even if they tried to
resist. Though neither the dhimmi nor the slave
had been faced with a choice between Islam and death, it
would be absurd to deny that force played a major role
in their conversion. 1
For the idolatrous Hindus,
enslaved in vast numbers during the waves of jihad
conquests that ravaged the Indian subcontinent for well
over a half millennium (beginning at the outset of the 8th
century C.E.), the guiding principles of Islamic law
regarding their fate were unequivocally coercive. Jihad
slavery also contributed substantively to the growth of
the Muslim population in India. K.S. Lal elucidates both
of these points 2 :
The Hindus who naturally
resisted Muslim occupation were considered to be rebels.
Besides they were idolaters (mushrik) and could not be
accorded the status of Kafirs, of the People of the Book
- Christians and Jews… Muslim scriptures and treatises
advocated jihad against idolaters for whom the law
advocated only Islam or death… The fact was that the
Muslim regime was giving [them] a choice between Islam
and death only. Those who were killed in battle were
dead and gone; but their dependents were made slaves.
They ceased to be Hindus; they were made Musalmans in
course of time if not immediately after captivity…slave
taking in India was the most flourishing and successful
[Muslim] missionary activity…Every Sultan, as [a]
champion of Islam, considered it a political necessity
to plant or raise [the] Muslim population all over India
for the Islamization of the country and countering
native resistance.
Vryonis describes how
jihad slavery, as practiced by the Seljuks and early
Ottomans, was an important modality of Islamization in
Asia Minor during the 11th through the 14th
century 3:
A further contributing
factor to the decline in the numbers of Christian
inhabitants was slavery…Since the beginning of the Arab
razzias into the land of Rum, human booty had come to
constitute a very important portion of the spoils. There
is ample testimony in the contemporary accounts that
this situation did not change when the Turks took over
the direction of the djihad in Anatolia. They enslaved
men, women, and children from all major urban centers
and from the countryside where the populations were
defenseless. In the earlier years before the Turkish
settlements were permanently affected in Anatolia, the
captives were sent off to Persia and elsewhere, but
after the establishment of the Anatolian Turkish
principalities, a portion of the enslaved were retained
in Anatolia for the service of the conquerors
After characterizing the
coercive, often brutal methods used to impose the
devshirme child levy, and the resulting attrition of the
native Christian populations (i.e., from both
expropriation and flight), Papoulia concludes that this
Ottoman institution, a method of Islamization par
excellence, also constituted a de facto state of war
4:
…that the sources speak of
piasimo (seizure) aichmalotos paidon (capture) and
arpage paidon (grabbing of children) indicates that the
children lost through the devþirme were understood as
casualties of war. Of course, the question arises
whether, according to Islamic law, it is possible to
regard the devþirme as a form of the state of war,
although the Ottoman historians during the empire's
golden age attempted to interpret this measure as a
consequence of conquest by force be’anwa. It is true
that the Greeks and the other peoples of the Balkan
peninsula did not as a rule surrender without
resistance, and therefore the fate of the conquered had
to be determined according to the principles of the
Koran regarding the Ahl-al-Qitâb: i.e. either to be
exterminated or be compelled to convert to Islam or to
enter the status of protection, of aman, by paying the
taxes and particularly the cizye (poll-tax). The fact
that the Ottomans, in the case of voluntary surrender,
conceded certain privileges one of which was exemption
from this heavy burden, indicates that its measure was
understood as a penalization for the resistance of the
population and the devshirme was an expression of the
perpetuation of the state of war between the conqueror
and the conquered… the sole existence of the institution
of devshirme is sufficient to postulate the perpetuation
of a state of war.
Under Shah Abbas I
(1588-1626 C.E.), the Safavid Shi’ite theocracy of Iran
expanded its earlier system of slave razzias into the
Christian Georgian and Armenian areas of the Caucasus.
Georgian, Armenian, and Circassian inhabitants of the
Caucasus were enslaved in large numbers, and converted,
thereby, to Shi’a Islam. The males were made to serve as
(primarily) military or administrative slaves, while the
females were forced into harems. A transition apparently
took place between the 17th and 18th
centuries such that fewer of the slaves came from the
Caucasus, while greater numbers came via the Persian
Gulf, originating from Africa. 5 Ricks notes
that by the reign of Shah Sultan Husayn,
The size of the royal
court had indeed expanded if the numbers of male and
female slaves including white and black eunuchs are any
indicators. According to a contemporary historian, Shah
Sultan Husayn (d. 1722) made it a practice to arrive at
Isfahan’s markets on the first days of the Iranian New
Year (March 21) with his entire court in attendance. It
was estimated by the contemporary recorder that 5,000
male and female black and white slaves including the 100
black eunuchs comprised the royal party. 6
Clement Huart, writing in
the early 20th century (1907), observed that
slaves, continued to be the most important component of
the booty acquired during jihad campaigns or
razzias 7:
Not too long ago several
expeditions crossed Amoû-Deryâ, i.e. the southern
frontier of the steppes, and ravaged the eastern regions
of Persia in order to procure slaves; other campaigns
were launched into the very heart of unexplored Africa,
setting fire to the inhabited areas and massacring the
peaceful animist populations that lived there.
Willis characterizes the
timeless Islamic rationale for the enslavement of such
“barbarous” African animists, as follows 8 :
…as the opposition of
Islam to kufr erupted from every corner of malice and
mistrust, the lands of the enslavable barbarian became
the favorite hunting ground for the “people of reason
and faith”—the parallels between slave and infidel began
to fuse in the heat of jihad. Hence whether by capture
or sale, it was as slave and not citizen that the kafir
was destined to enter the Muslim domain. And since the
condition of captives flowed from the status of their
territories, the choice between freedom and servility
came to rest on a single proof: the religion of a land
is the religion of its amir (ruler); if he be Muslim,
the land is a land of Islam (dar al-Islam); if he be
pagan, the land is a land of unbelief (dar al-kufr).
Appended to this principle was the kindred notion that
the religion of a land is the religion of its majority;
if it be Muslim, the land is a land of Islam; if it be
pagan, the land is a land of kufr, and its inhabitants
can be reckoned within the categories of enslavement
under Muslim law. Again, as slavery became a simile for
infidelity, so too did freedom remain the signal feature
of Islam…The servile estate was hewn out of the ravaged
remains of heathen villages- from the women and children
who submitted to Islam and awaited their
redemption…[according to Muslim jurist] al-Wanshirisi
(d.1508), slavery is an affliction upon those who
profess no Prophecy, who bear no allegiance to religious
law. Moreover, slavery is an humiliation- a subjection-
which rises from infidelity.
Based on his study and
observations of Muslim slave razzias gleaned while
serving in the Sudan during the Mahdist jihad at
the close of the 19th century, Winston
Churchill wrote this description (in 1899) 9
:
all [of the Arab Muslim
tribes in The Sudan], without exception, were hunters of
men. To the great slave markets of Jeddah a continual
stream of negro captives has flowed for hundreds of
years. The invention of gunpowder and the adoption by
the Arabs of firearms facilitated the traffic…Thus the
situation in the Sudan for several centuries may be
summed up as follows: The dominant race of Arab invaders
was increasingly spreading its blood, religion, customs,
and language among the black aboriginal population, and
at the same time it harried and enslaved them…The
warlike Arab tribes fought and brawled among themselves
in ceaseless feud and strife. The negroes trembled in
apprehension of capture, or rose locally against their
oppressors.
All these elements of
jihad slavery- its juridical rationale, employment
as a method of forcible Islamization (for non-Muslims in
general, and directed at Sub-Saharan African Animists,
specifically), and its association with devshirme-like
levies of adolescent males for slave soldiering- are
apparent in the contemporary jihad being waged
against the Animists and Christians of southern Sudan,
by the Arab Muslim-dominated Khartoum regime 10.
Extent and Persistence
The scale and scope of
Islamic slavery in Africa are comparable to the Western
trans-Atlantic slave trade to the Americas, and as
Willis has observed (somewhat wryly) 11, the
former “…out-distances the more popular subject in its
length of duration”. Quantitative estimates for the
trans-Atlantic slave trade (16th through the
end of the 19th century) of 10,500,000 (or
somewhat higher 12), are at least matched (if
not exceeded by 50%) by a contemporary estimate for the
Islamic slave trade out of Africa. Professor Ralph
Austen’s working figure for this composite of the
trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean traffic
generated by the Islamic slave trade from 650 through
1905 C.E., is 17,000,000. 13 Moreover, the
plight of those enslaved animist peoples drawn from the
savannah and northern forest belts of western and
central Africa for the trans-Saharan trade was
comparable to the sufferings experienced by the
unfortunate victims of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
14
In the nineteenth century,
slaves reached the ports of Ottoman Tripoli by three
main Saharan routes, all so harsh that the experience of
slaves forced to travel them bore comparison with the
horrors of the so-called “middle-passage” of the
Atlantic.
This illuminating
comparison, important as it is, ignores other vast
domains of jihad slavery: throughout Europe
(Mediterranean and Western Europe, as well as Central
and Eastern Europe, involving the Arabs
[Western/Mediterranean], and later the Ottoman Turks and
Tatars [Central and Eastern Europe]); Muscovite Russia
(subjected to Tatar depredations); Asia Minor (under
Seljuk and Ottoman domination); Persia, Armenia, and
Georgia (subjected to the systematized jihad slavery
campaigns waged by the Shi’ite Safavids, in particular);
and the Indian subcontinent (razzias and jihad campaigns
by the Arabs in the 7th and 8th
centuries, and later depredations by the Ghaznavids,
during the Delhi Sultanate, the Timurid jihad, and under
the Mughals). As a cursory introduction to the extent of
jihad slavery beyond the African continent, three brief
examples are provided: the Seljuks in Asia Minor (11th
and 12th centuries); the Ottomans in the
Balkans (15th century); and the Tatars in
southern Poland and Muscovite Russia (mid-15th
through 17th centuries).
The capture of Christians
in Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turks was very extensive in
the 11th and 12th centuries.
15 Following the seizure and pillage of Edessa,
16,000 were enslaved. 16 Michael the Syrian
reported that when the Turks of Nur al-Din were brought
into Cilicia by Mleh the Armenian, they enslaved 16,000
Christians, whom they sold at Aleppo. 17 A
major series of razzias conducted in the Greek provinces
of Western Asia Minor enslaved thousands of Greeks
(Vryonis believes the figure of 100,000 cited in a
contemporary account is exaggerated 18), and
according to Michael the Syrian, they were sold in slave
markets as distant as Persia. 19 During
razzias conducted by the Turks in 1185 and over the next
few years, 26,000 inhabitants from Cappadocia, Armenian,
and Mesopotamia were captured and sent off to the slave
markets. 20 Vryonis concludes 21 :
…these few sources seem to
indicate that the slave trade was a flourishing one. In
fact, Asia Minor continued to be a major source of
slaves for the Islamic world through the 14th
century.
The Ottoman Sultans, in
accord with Shari’a prescriptions, promoted jihad
slavery aggressively in the Balkans, especially during
the 15th century reigns of Mehmed I
(1402-1421), Murad II (1421-1451), and Mehmed II
(1451-1481). 22 Alexandrescu-Dersca
summarizes the considerable extent of this enslavement,
and suggests the importance of its demographic effect
23 :
The contemporary Turkish,
Byzantine and Latin chroniclers are unanimous in
recognizing that during the campaigns conducted on
behalf of the unification of Greek and Latin Romania and
the Slavic Balkans under the banner of Islam, as well as
during their razzias on Christian territory, the
Ottomans reduced masses of inhabitants to slavery. The
Ottoman chronicler Ašikpašazade relates that during the
expedition of Ali pasha Evrenosoghlu in Hungary (1437),
as well as on the return from the campaign of Murad II
against Belgrade (1438), the number of captives
surpassed that of the combatants. The Byzantine
chronicler Ducas states that the inhabitants of
Smederevo, which was occupied by the Ottomans, were led
off into bondage. The same thing happened when the Turks
of Menteše descended upon the islands of Rhodes and Cos
and also during the expedition of the Ottoman fleet to
Enos and Lesbos. Ducas even cites numbers: 70,000
inhabitants carried off into slavery during the campaign
of Mehmed II in Morée (1460). The Italian Franciscan
Bartholomé de Yano (Giano dell’Umbria) speaks about
60,000 to 70,000 slaves captured over the course of two
expeditions of the akinðis in Transylvania (1438)
and about 300,000 to 600,000 Hungarian captives. If
these figures seem exaggerated, others seem more
accurate: forty inhabitants captured by the Turks of
Menteše during a razzia in Rhodes, 7,000
inhabitants reduced to slavery following the siege of
Thessalonika (1430), according to John Anagnostes, and
ten thousand inhabitants led off into captivity during
the siege of Mytilene (1462), according to the
Metropolitan of Lesbos, Leonard of Chios. Given the
present state of the documentation available to us, we
cannot calculate the scale on which slaves were
introduced into Turkish Romania by this method.
According to Bartholomé de Yano, it would amount to
400,000 slaves captured in the four years from 1437 to
1443. Even allowing for a certain degree of
exaggeration, we must acknowledge that slaves played an
important demographic part during the fifteenth-century
Ottoman expansion.
Fisher 24 has
analyzed the slave razzias conducted by the Muslim
Crimean Tatars against the Christian populations of
southern Poland and Muscovite Russia during the mid-15th
through late 17th century (1463-1794).
Relying upon admittedly incomplete sources (“…no doubt
there are many more slave raids that the author has not
uncovered” 25), his conservative tabulations
26 indicate that at least 3 million
(3,000,000) persons- men, women, and children- were
captured and enslaved during this so-called “harvesting
of the steppe”. Fisher describes the plight of those
enslaved: 27
…the first ordeal [of the
captive] was the long march to the Crimea. Often in
chains and always on foot, many of the captives died en
route. Since on many occasions the Tatar raiding party
feared reprisals or, in the seventeenth century,
attempts by Cossack bands to free the captives, the
marches were hurried. Ill or wounded captives were
usually killed rather than be allowed to slow the
procession. Heberstein wrote… “the old and infirm men
who will not fetch much as a sale, are given up to the
Tatar youths either to be stoned, or thrown into the
sea, or to be killed by any sort of death they might
please.” An Ottoman traveler in the mid-sixteenth
century who witnessed one such march of captives from
Galicia marveled that any would reach their destination-
the slave markets of Kefe. He complained that their
treatment was so bad that the mortality rate would
unnecessarily drive their price up beyond the reach of
potential buyers such as himself. A Polish proverb
stated: “Oh how much better to lie on one’s bier, than
to be a captive on the way to Tartary”
The persistence of Islamic
slavery is as impressive and unique as its extent.
Slavery was openly practiced in both Ottoman Turkey
28, and Shi’ite (Qajar) Iran 29,
through the first decade of the 20th century.
As Toledano points out, 30 regarding Ottoman
Turkey, kul (administrative)/ harem
slavery,
…survived at the core of
the Ottoman elite until the demise of the empire and the
fall of the house of Osman in the second decade of the
20th century.
Moreover, Ricks 31
indicates that despite the modernizing pressures and
reforms culminating in the Iranian Constitutional
Movement of 1905-1911, which effectively eliminated
military and agricultural slavery,
The presence of domestic
slaves, however, in both the urban and rural regions of
Southern Iran had not ceased as quickly. Some Iranians
today attest to the continued presence of African and
Indian slave girls…
Slavery on the Arabian
peninsula was not abolished formally until 1962 in Saudi
Arabia, 32 and 1970 in Yemen and Oman.
33 Writing in 1989, Gordon 34 observed
that although Mauritania abolished slavery officially on
July 15, 1980,
…as the government itself
acknowledges, the practice is till alive and well. It is
estimated that 200,000 men, women, and children are
subject to being bought and sold like so many cattle in
this North African country, toiling as domestics,
shepherds, and farmhands.
Finally, as discussed
earlier, there has been a recrudescence of jihad
slavery, since 1983 in the Sudan. 35
An Overview of Eunuch
Slavery-the “Hideous Trade”
Eunuch slaves- males
castrated usually between the ages of 4 and 12 (due to
the high risk of death, preferentially, between ages 8
and 12) 36, were in considerable demand in
Islamic societies. They served most notably as
supervisors of women in the harems of the rulers and
elites of the Ottoman Empire, its contemporary Muslim
neighbors (such as Safavid Iran), and earlier Muslim
dominions. The extent and persistence of eunuch slavery-
becoming prominent within 200 years of the initial 7th
century Arab jihad conquests 37, through the
beginning of the 20th century 38-
are peculiar to the Islamic incarnation of this aptly
named “hideous trade”. For example, Toledano documents
that as late as 1903, the Ottoman imperial harem
contained from 400 to 500 female slaves, supervised and
guarded by 194 black African eunuchs. 39
But an equally important
and unique feature of Muslim eunuch slavery was the
acquisition of eunuchs from foreign “slave producing
areas” 40, i.e., non-Muslim frontier zones
subjected to razzias. As David Ayalon observed, 41
…the overwhelming majority
of the eunuchs, like the overwhelming majority of all
other slaves in Islam, had been brought over from
outside the borders of Muslim lands.
Eunuch slaves in China, in
stark contrast, were almost exclusively Chinese procured
locally. 42
Hogendorn 43
has identified the three main slave producing regions,
as they evolved in importance over time, from the 8th
through the late 19th centuries:
These areas were the
forested parts of central and eastern Europe called by
Muslims the “Bild as-Saqaliba” (“slave country”), the
word saqlab meaning slave in Arabic (and related to the
ethnic designation “Slav”); the steppes of central Asia
called the “Bilad al-Atrak” (“Turks’ country” or
Turkestan); and eventually most important, the savanna
and the fringes of the wooded territory south of the
Sahara called the country of the blacks or “Bilad
as-Sudan”.
Lastly, given the
crudeness of available surgical methods and absence of
sterile techniques, the human gelding procedure by which
eunuchs were “manufactured” was associated with
extraordinary rates of morbidity and mortality.
Hogendorn describes the severity of the operation, and
provides mortality information from West and East
Africa: 44
Castration can be partial
(removal of the testicles only or removal of the penis
only), or total (removal of both). In the later period
of the trade, that is, after Africa became the most
important source for Mediterranean Islam, it appears
that most eunuchs sold to the markets underwent total
removal. This version of the operation, though
considered most appropriate for slaves in constant
proximity to harem members, posed a very high danger of
death for two reasons. First was the extensive
hemorrhaging, with the consequent possibility of almost
immediate death. The hemorrhaging could not be stopped
by traditional cauterization because that would close
the urethra leading to eventual death because of
inability to pass urine. The second danger lay in
infection of the urethra, with the formation of pus
blocking it and so causing death in a few days.
…when the castration was
carried out in sub-Saharan West and West-Central
Africa…a figure of 90% [is] often mentioned. Even higher
death rates were occasionally reported, unsurprising in
tropical areas where the danger of infection of wounds
was especially high. At least one contemporary price
quotation supports a figure of over 90% mortality:
Turkish merchants are said to have been willing to pay
250 to 300 (Maria Theresa) dollars each for eunuchs in
Borno (northeast Nigeria) at a time when the local price
of young male slaves does not seem to have exceeded
about 20 dollars…Many sources indicate very high death
rates from the operation in eastern Africa.. Richard
Millant’s [1908] general figure for the Sudan and
Ethiopia is 90%
Conclusion
Contemporary
manifestations of Islamic slavery—certainly the
razzias (raids) waged by Arab Muslim militias
against their black Christian, animist, and
animist-Muslim prey in both the southern Sudan and
Darfur—and even in its own context, the persistence of
slavery in Mauritania (again, black slaves, Arab
masters)—reflect the pernicious impact of jihad slavery
as an enduring Muslim institution. Even Ottoman society,
arguably the most progressive in Muslim history, and
upheld just recently at a
United Nations conference as a paragon of Islamic
ecumenism,
never produced a William Wilberforce, much less a broad,
religiously-based slavery abolition movement spearheaded
by committed Muslim ulema. Indeed,
it is only modern Muslim
freethinkers, anachronistically referred to as
“apostates”, who have had the courage and intellectual
integrity to renounce the jihad,
including jihad slavery, unequivocally, and based upon
an honest acknowledgement of its devastating military
and social history. When the voices of these Muslim
freethinkers are silenced in the Islamic world—by
imprisonment and torture, or execution—the outcome is
tragic, but hardly unexpected. That such insightful and
courageous voices have been marginalized or ignored
altogether in the West is equally tragic and reflects
the distressing ignorance of Western policymaking
elites.
Notes
1. Patricia
Crone. God’s Rule. Government and Islam. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 371-72
2. K.S. Lal,
Muslim Slave System India, New Delhi, Aditya
Prakashan, 1994, pp. 46, 69.
3. Speros
Vryonis, Jr. The Decline of Medieval Hellenism and
the Islamization of Asia Minor, 11th Through
15th Century, 1971, Berkeley: University
of California Press, pp. 174-175.
4.
Vasiliki Papoulia.
“The impact of devshirme on
Greek society” in East Central European
society and war in the prerevolutionary eighteenth
century. Gunther E. Rothenberg, Béla K. Király and
Peter F. Sugar, editors. Boulder : Social Science
Monographs ; New York : Distributed by Columbia
University Press, 1982, pp. 555-556.
5. Thomas
Ricks. “Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran, AD
1500-1900”, Journal of Asian and African Studies,
2001, Vol. 36, pp. 407-418.
6. Ricks,
“Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran”, pp. 411-412.
7. Clement
Huart. “Le droit de la guerre” Revue du monde
musulman, 1907, p. 337. English translation by
Michael J. Miller.
8. John Ralph
Willis. "Jihad and the ideology of enslavement", in
Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa- vol. 1.
Islam and the ideology of enslavement, London,
England; Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1985, pp. 17-18; 4.
9. Winston
Churchill. The River War, Vol. II ,
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899, pp. 248-50.
10.
John Eibner. “My career
redeeming slaves”, Middle East Quarterly,
December, 1999, Vol. 4, Number 4,
http://www.meforum.org/article/449 . Eibner
notes:
…based on the pattern of
slave raiding over the past fifteen years and the
observations of Western and Arab travelers in southern
Darfur and Kordofan, conservatively puts the number of
chattel slaves close to or over 100,000. There are many
more in state-owned concentration camps, euphemistically
called "peace camps" by the government of Sudan, and in
militant Qur'anic schools, where boys train to become
mujahidun (warriors of jihad).
11. John Ralph
Willis. Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa,
Preface, p. vii.
12. This
controversial topic is discussed here: Philip D. Curtin,
Roger Antsey, J.E. Inikori. The Journal of African
History, 1976, Vol. 17, pp. 595-627.
13. John Ralph
Willis. Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa,
Preface, p. x.
14. John
Wright. “The Mediterranean Middle Passage: The
Nineteenth Century Slave Trade Between Triploi and the
Levant”, The Journal of North African Studies,
1996, Vol. 1, p. 44.
15. Vryonis,
The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245.
16. Bar
Hebraeus.
The chronography of Gregory Abû'l Faraj, the son of
Aaron, the Hebrew physician, commonly known as Bar
Hebraeus; being the first part of his political history
of the world,
translated from the Syriac by Ernest A. Wallis Budge,
Oxford University Press, 1932, Vol. 1, pp. 268-273;
Michael the Syrian,
Chronique de Michel le
Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199),
translated by J-B Chabot, 1895, Vol. 3, p. 331.
17. Michael the
Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, p. 331.
18. Vryonis,
The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245.
19. Michael the
Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, p. 369.
20. Michael the
Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, pp. 401-402; Bar
Hebraeus, The Chronography, Vol. 1, p. 321.
21. Vryonis,
The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245.
22. M-M
Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru.
“Le role des escalves en Romanie turque
au XVe siecle” Byzantinische Forschungen, vol.
11, 1987, p. 15.
23.
Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, “Le role des escalves en
Romanie turque au XVe siecle”, pp. 16-17.
24. Alan Fisher
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25. Fisher
“Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade”, p. 579, note
17.
26. Fisher
“Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade”, pp. 580-582.
27. Fisher
“Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade”, pp. 582-583.
28. Reuben
Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge
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29. Ricks,
“Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran”, p. 408.
30. Ehud
Toledano. Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle
East, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998,
p. 53.
31. Ricks,
“Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran”, p. 415.
32. Murray
Gordon. Slavery in the Arab World, New York: New
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33. Gordon.
Slavery in the Arab World, p. 234.
34. Gordon.
Slavery in the Arab World, Preface, second page
(pages not numbered).
35. Eibner,
“My career redeeming slaves”.
36.
Jan Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade. Economic Aspects of
the ‘Manufacture’ and Sale of Eunuchs”, Paideuma,
1999, Vol. 45, p. 143, especially, note 25.
37.
Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade”, p. 137.
38.
Ehud Toledano. “The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From
Africa to the Heart of Islam”, Middle Eastern Studies,
1984, Vol. 20, pp. 379-390.
39.
Toledano. “The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul”, pp.
380-381.
40.
Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade”, p. 138.
41.
David Ayalon. “On the Eunuchs in Islam”, Jerusalem
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69-70.
42.
Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade”, p. 139, note 5.
43.
Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade”, p. 139.
44.
Hogendorn. “The Hideous Trade”, pp. 143, 145-146.